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Abstract 
Information security issues are characterized with interdependence. Particularly, cyber criminals 
can easily cross national boundaries and exploit jurisdictional limitations between countries. Thus, 
whether cyber attacks are spatially autocorrelated is a strategic issue for government authorities 
and a tactic issue for insurance companies. Through an empirical study of cyber attacks across 62 
countries during the period 2003-2007, we find little evidence on the spatial autocorrelation of 
cyber attacks at any week. However, after considering economic opportunity, IT infrastructure, 
international collaboration in enforcement and conventional crimes, we find strong evidence that 
cyber attacks were indeed spatially autocorrelated as they moved over time. The policy and 
managerial implication is that physical boundary should be an important factor in addressing 
strategic cyber attacks and their potential risks. 
 
Keywords:  Information Security, cyber attacks, interdependence, physical boundary 
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Introduction 
Information security issues are characterized with interdependence of risks. First, millions of thousands of 
computers and network systems are connected to the Internet while few software vendors are dominant in IT 
markets. Thus, one kind of vulnerability or risk in any particular system can easily spread to the whole network via 
physical linkage or be found in other systems using the same software platform. Second, IT has enabled in-depth-
and-breadth collaboration across organizational or country boundaries. Hence the security of any particular user is 
often dependent on the effort of other users in the same value chain (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Varian 2004). 
Third, information and communication technology has facilitated information security violators to attack across 
national boundaries. While conventional criminals tend to be localized, cyber criminals can easily cross national 
boundaries and exploit jurisdictional limitations between countries (Kshetri 2006).  
The interdependent nature of information security has important implications for public policies and business 
strategies. Government can directly address information security through enforcement against attackers. In an 
empirical study about the impact of information security enforcement on cyber attacks, Png et. al (2008) find 
insignificant deterrent effect of domestic enforcement on cyber attacks. However, they find compelling evidence of 
a displacement effect: U.S. enforcement substantially increases attacks originating from other countries. 
Understanding the nature of country-level interdependence can guide governments to identify its counterparts to 
collaborate with and to effectively reduce the volume of attacks. Organizations manage information security risk 
through elimination, mitigation absorbance and transference (Böhme and Kataria 2006). In a review of the evolution 
of cyber-insurance, Majuca et al. (2006) propose cyber-insurance as a powerful strategy for firms to transfer the 
residual information security risk. However, given the rampantly growing market for malicious online activities 
(Symantec 2008), the cyber-insurance market is both underdeveloped and underutilized due to the interdependent 
risks (Böhme and Kataria 2006). As discussed by Anderson and Moore (2008), “Interdependence can make some 
cyber-risks unattractive to insurers – particularly those risks that are globally rather than locally correlated”. 
The importance of interdependence in information security has attracted academia interests. The existing analytical 
work focus on user’s incentives in network systems (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Varian 2004) and the empirical 
work focus on modeling risk arrival process and estimation of correlations within and between firms via simulation 
and honeypot experiments (Böhme and Kataria 2006). To our best knowledge, no study has examined the 
fundamental issue that whether and how cyber attacks are correlated at the country level. A better understanding of 
the nature of interdependence at the country level would be the first step towards international collaboration and 
advanced cyber-insurance. 
In this paper, we study the above issues using a sample of attacks originating from 62 countries over the period 
between January 2003 and December 2007. We first employ spatial autocorrelation (Moran 1950) into the static 
analysis of cyber attacks across countries. Further, we develop a two-stage model to enable a panel data analysis of 
the interdependence of cyber attacks movement between countries. Specifically, we model country-level cyber 
attacks through worldwide-systematic risk and non-worldwide risk. We further divide the non-worldwide risk into 
country-specific risk and country-to-country interdependent risk. For any pair of countries, their interdependence in 
cyber attacks is measured by the correlation of the residuals that cannot be explained by worldwide systematic risk 
and country-independent risk during the period of year t. Although in this study, we are most interested in 
examining whether and to what extent physical boundaries contribute to cyber attack interdependence, we control 
for any other possible impacts following the interdependence theory in the literature of international economics. 
While interdependence theory links country conflicts to countries’ relative status in democracy, economic growth, 
alliance, political change, and trade interdependence, etc. (Oneal and  Russett 1997), we explain the country-to-
country interdependence in cyber attacks through countries’ relative status in aspects that may affect attackers’ 
economic incentives. Those aspects are captured from the dimensions of economy, technology, industry, 
international cooperation in enforcement and criminal culture. In particular, we measure the international 
cooperation in enforcement by the status of a country in joining the EU Convention on Cybercrimes.  
The Council of Europe, along with the U.S., Canada and Japan signed the Convention on Cybercrimes, Europe 
Treaty Series No. 185, the first International treaty for crimes performed through Internet and other computer 
networks, on 23 November 2001. One of the main purposes of the convention is for “setting up a fast and effective 
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regime of international co-operation”.1 By the end of 2007, 39 EU countries and 4 non-EU countries have signed the 
convention and 21 countries out of them have further ratified and enacted it. Hence, the status of a country in joining 
the EU Convention on Cybercrimes can be considered as an important measure of international cooperation in 
enforcement against cyber attacks. 
Our empirical findings are reported as following. Firstly, the static analysis shows that cyber attacks in general were 
not spatially autocorrelated at any week, with an average autocorrelation as low as 0.022. However, in the two-stage 
panel data analysis, the physical distance between countries has significantly negative effect on the interdependence 
of cyber attacks between countries, and the interdependence was relatively higher for continentally neighbored 
countries. These findings suggest that although, in the short term, no-discrimination cyber attacks including worms 
and viruses may randomly spread over the Internet, in the long term, attackers do discriminate targets with different 
physical locations. Further we find that the impact of physical distance on the interdependence is lower for any pair 
of countries with different status in joining the EU Convention on Cybercrimes. This evidences the belief that cyber 
attacks may strategically migrate to distant countries to exploit jurisdictional limitations between countries. The 
implication is that the jurisdictional boundaries could reduce the spatial autocorrelation in cyber attacks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature in the economics 
of information security. Section 3 presents our model and methodology. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. In the last section, we discuss the policy implications to public authorities, cyber 
insurance companies and organization users and the future research direction. 
Literature Review 
Poor security incurs economic losses to firms. For example, several studies have examined the impact of 
information security breaches on the market value of companies (Campbell et al. 2003; Cavusoglu et al. 2004; 
Kannan and Telang 2005). Telang and Wattal (2007) have studied the impact of vulnerability disclosure on the 
software vendors’ stock prices. Perceiving the economic costs, one of the important questions is how to reduce the 
security risks. Png et al. (2008) study the deterrent and displacement effect of enforcement on the number of cyber 
attacks. August and Tunca (2006) compare the effectiveness of different policies on software patching under 
negative network externalities. Cavusoglu et al. (2005) have found the deterrent effect of intrusion detection 
systems. Nizovtsev and Thursby (2007) study the conditions where full disclosure of vulnerabilities enhances social 
welfare by considering the interactions among white hat users, black hat users, and a vendor. Anderson et al. (2008) 
emphasize the importance of an appropriate regulatory framework and make policy recommendations to tackle 
information and network security. For example, they recommend, “the European Commission put immediate 
pressure on the 15 EU Member States that have yet to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.” 
These studies show that the security policies play a critical role in managing the security issues and the policies 
should consider the economic incentives of involved parties. Another important implication in the literature is that 
the interdependent nature of cyber attacks and risks poses a major challenge to policy makers (Kunreuther and Heal 
2003; Varian 2004). The interdependence has important implications for development of cyber insurance as well. 
When risks are interdependent, one entity’s decision to invest in cyber insurance influences the risks carried by other 
entities (Bolot and Lelarge 2008). The highest level of interdependence is at the country level (Böhme and Kataria 
2006). The discussion of the literature naturally leads to the research question that we aim to study in the paper: 
what government policies will help address the cyber risks and interdependence at the country level.  
Model and Methodology 
We first employ spatial autocorrelation into the static analysis of cyber attacks across countries. Moran’s I (Moran 
1950) is a commonly adopted measure of spatial autocorrelation to detect departures of the same phenomenon from 
spatial randomness. Moran’s I requires a matrix of spatial weights and is calculated as  
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where ijw  is the weight between i  and j , x  is the sample mean, and N  is the number of spatial units. Thus, 
positive (negative) value means positive (negative) spatial autocorrelation. The Moran’s I can also calculate Z score 
to test for statistical significance of spatial autocorrelation. When the Z score indicates any statistical significance, 
the Moran's I value near 1.0 indicates positive clustering. The Moran’s I value near zero with statistical significance 
indicates dispersion. By generating the spatial weights matrix based on the longitudes and latitudes of the 62 
countries, we are able to compute Moran's I, the global spatial autocorrelation statistics for cyber attacks at any 
given time.  
However, this approach would not give us a longitudinal view of the spatial autocorrelation of cyber attacks. 
Therefore, we further use a two-stage model to measure and characterize the cross-country interdependence of cyber 
attacks. We are particularly interested in examining the effect, if any, of physical distance and country boundary on 
the interdependence, and how it may be affected by other factors. 
We divide overall cyber attacks into worldwide systematic effects and non-worldwide effects. The worldwide 
systematic effect refers to the risk associated with aggregate worldwide cyber attacks to which every country is 
vulnerable. The non-worldwide effect implies the risk associated with the cyber attacks to which only a subset of 
countries is vulnerable. There are three important reasons to support the existence of worldwide systematic attacks. 
First, some cyber attacks such as worms may spread to any randomly chosen hosts over the network that is not 
constrained by country borders. Second, the worldwide effects can be caused by the disclosure and exploit of any 
vulnerability in a standard software platform or the evolution of knowledge base in attacker community. Third, 
strategic attackers choose any source of attacks to reduce the detection probability and increase the chance of 
success as well. To the contrary, some attacks may not be associated with the aggregate level risk that should be the 
function of characteristics pertaining to specific country. For instance, more attacks may originate from a particular 
country as its Internet user base is large. Some hackers may systematically choose a particular country as a source of 
bot net attacks as they are more familiar to the country.  
Since the cyber space is digitalized and the network systems of every country are closely linked with each other via 
the Internet, the transportation cost in cyber space is almost negligible, which increases the inherent interdependence 
between countries. On the other hand, some risks may be very unique to a particular country and do not contribute to 
the risks faced by other countries. Based on the reasoning, we further divide the non-worldwide effect into country-
specific effect and country-to-country interdependent effect.  
In the literature on the economic analysis of crime in general, potential criminals weigh the benefits and cost of 
crime (Becker 1968; Freeman 1999; Polinsky and Shavell 2000). Following Png et al. (2008), we consider the 
country-specific effect as those that affect attackers’ economic incentives (i.e., opportunity cost, expected risk, and 
potential benefit), but is independent of other countries. While they include domestic enforcement event to measure 
the attackers’ expected risk, we replace it with the indicator about the status of a country in joining the EU 
Convention on Cybercrimes. With dedicated principles related to international co-operation including extradition 
and mutual assistance, the EU Convention on Cybercrimes may deter attackers who are not constrained by physical 
boundaries. We further include control variables related to IT industry infrastructure and conventional crimes. 
For any pair of countries, their interdependence in cyber attacks is measured by the correlation of the residuals 
during the period of year t that cannot be explained by worldwide systematic effects and country-specific effects. 
Following the literature in the independence theory where relationships between countries are used to explain the 
country conflicts (Oneal and Russett 1997), we explain the country-to-country interdependence in cyber attacks by 
the geographical distance and the non-geographical distance between a pair of countries. The geographical distance 
is measured by physical distance between countries and whether countries share some continental boundary. The 
non-geographical distance refers to the relative status between countries from the perspectives that are identified in 
country-specific effects. Figure 1 presents our cyber-attack interdependence model. In the next section, we will 
discuss the measurements for each factor listed in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In the first stage of the regression, the dependent variable is the ratio of the number of attacks originating in country 
i in week w over the total number of attacks from all countries, denoted by iwr . By using the ratio rather than 
absolute volume, we can filter out fluctuation in cyber attacks resulted from worldwide-systematic effects. We 
regress the ratio of attacks per country per week on the country-specific independent variables iwC , year dummy 
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variables, tY  and a set of country dummy variables, iN . By equation (1), we derive the residual iweˆ , which 
captures the observable and unobservable country-specific time-variant characteristics and international time-variant 
characteristics that are shared among a few countries. 
iw t iw i iwr Y C N eα γ= + + + +       (1) 
     
Note that c  and tY  together capture the worldwide systematic effects while the rest captures the non-worldwide 
effects. In the second stage, we first calculate the interdependence between any country pair (i,j) in year t as the 
correlation of their residuals within the period, 
{ } { }) ˆ,...,ˆ ,  ˆ,...,ˆ ( 11 jstjtistitijt eeeecorrr = ,      (2) 
where 1, …, s are the sequence of weeks in year t. Then we regress the interdependence between any country pair 
(i,j) in year t on the geographical distance variables, ijG ,  non-geographical variables, ijtD , and year dummies tY . 
Since ijG variables do not vary with time, we use the random effect model. The equation for the second stage is 
ij
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ij
t
ijij
t YDGr εγβα ++++= ''' .      (3) 
Data 
The SANS Institute established the Internet Storm Center (ISC) in 2001 to assist Internet Service Providers and end-
users to defend against malicious attacks through the Internet.  The ISC follows the data collection, analysis, and 
warning system used in weather forecasting.  The ISC draws millions of intrusion detection samples from many 
diverse locations to provide an accurate representation of Internet activity every day.  This information is compiled 
in the DShield database. Previous study like Png et al. (2008) that uses the same datasets may be biased due to the 
limitation of ISC statistics: they only identify the originating country of the attacking packets by IP address although 
the originating computers may be under the remote control of attackers located in other countries. This is not a 
critical problem in our study because our model takes into account the number of attacks as a result of the 
interdependence between countries. For instance, if some attacks originating from country i are actually caused by 
attacks originating country j, they cannot be explained in the first stage regression by the worldwide-systematic 
effects or country-specific effects, and thus be captured by residual factor ˆiwe . Further, if this interdependence 
between country i and country j is not accidental but strategic, we would see a correlation ijtr in the time series of 
ˆiwe which can be explained in the second stage regression.     
Our ISC country-level reports include the daily number of attacks for more than 200 countries from January 2003 
onward.2  We cut off our data collection on December 31, 2007.  The sample period comprises 60 months or about 
1826 days.  However, for unknown reasons, ISC did not report attacks for some periods. Thus, the actual number of 
observations in our dataset ranges between 1,050 and 1,402 days per country. We focus on 62 countries with the 
number of internet users over 500,000 as the frequencies of detected attacks from the rest of the countries are low. 
To avoid the bias caused by time difference among countries, we aggregate the data at weekly basis. 
Table 1 lists the measurements for each factor presented in Figure 1. We collected the country level data from the 
GMID (Global Market Information Database) and the WDI (World Development Indicators) provided by the World 
                                                          
2
 The country-level number of reports published by ISC was defined as the average number of packets reported from each IP address in the 
respective country. 
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Bank. Table 2 shows the status and date for each country who have signed the EU Convention on Cybercrimes. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in addition to their sources.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Empirical Results 
As a preliminary analysis, we first computed the Moran-I spatial autocorrelation for the number of weekly attacks 
among the 62 countries during the period from 2003 to 2007. A far-from-zero Moran-I statistics indicates a high 
spatial autocorrelation (either positive or negative) in cyber attacks among countries. As shown in Figure 2, the 
spatial autocorrelation ranges from 0.0063 to 0.0375 and does not exhibit any time trend during years 2003~2007. 
We next replaced the number of weekly attacks originating from each country with the ratio of weekly attacks over 
the total number of attacks within the 62 countries. The spatial autocorrelations are a bit higher but still at the low 
level between 0.019 and 0.123. Considering that countries differ in their Internet user base, we further computed the 
spatial autocorrelation of the weekly number of attacks per Internet user, as shown in Figure 2. However, the change 
of the measurement on cyber attacks does not affect the observation that cyber attacks were not spatially 
autocorrelated at any week of our studied period. In other words, statically, neighboring countries do not exhibit 
similar scale of cyber attacks no matter what measures of cyber attacks are used at least on a weekly basis. 
To conduct a panel data analysis on spatial autocorrelation of cyber attacks, we followed the cyber attack 
interdependence model as presented in Figure 1. We conducted two-stage regressions to estimate equation (1) and 
(3). The results of the stage 1 using a fixed effects regression are reported in Table 4, column (a). The panel data 
exhibited high serial correlation, significant heteroskedasticity (χ2 (62)= 36549), and cross-sectional interdependence 
(Pesaran's test = 28.6). The residuals, with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and interdependence, were used in 
stage 2 to calculate the yearly-based country-pairwise interdependence. However, to ensure consistency and 
efficiency of the coefficients, we further employed linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors that 
assumes panel-specific AR1 (First-order autoregession) autocorrelation structure and cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and interdependence (Freeman 1999, Donald & Lang 2007). The results are reported in Table 4, 
column (b). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Although not the focus of this paper, the estimates for several coefficients are notable. As expected, the coefficient 
of GDP per capita is positive and significant. Since the number of hosts reporting to ISC is proportional to a 
country’s Internet scale, the Internet access variable is supposed to adjust the possible sample bias. The coefficient 
for internet access, however, is significantly negative, which suggests that a larger Internet user base is not 
necessarily associated with more sources of attacks. For other control variables, the import ratio of computer, 
communication and other service, and the offences, both have negative and significant coefficients. Most 
interestingly, the coefficient of the indicator of signature for the EU Convention on Cybercrimes is negative and 
significant3. This suggests strong international cooperation in enforcement against cyber attacks may deter attacks 
originating from the specific country. 
We further included more variables to control for other possible country-specific independent effects (e.g., Internet 
monthly subscription price, the number of Internet secure servers located in the country, and the unemployment rate 
with tertiary education). However, the data on these variables are missing for some countries (e.g., China, the United 
States, etc). Thus, we had only half of the total observations. Table 4, column (c) reports the results with other 
control variables available to us. The coefficient of the EU Convention on cyber-crime indicator is still negative and 
significant. The coefficients of the three additional variables had the expected signs. Particularly, the unemployment 
rate with tertiary education is positively associated with the number of cyber attacks originating from the country. 
While previous study using general unemployment rate did not show any significantly positive impact of 
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 The coefficients of the indicators for ratification or entry-into-force of the convention are not significant due to the highly correlation between 
them and the smaller number of observations. 
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unemployment on cyber attacks (Png et al. 2008), here we find that unemployment rate for tertiary education may be 
a more accurate measure of the potential workforce for cyber attacks. 
Based on the first stage results and referring to equation (2), we calculated the country-pairwise correlations per 
country pair per year to measure the interdependence between countries. This generated another panel data with 
7725 observations. Among them, 4649 observations have positive correlation in the time series of residuals between 
countries. Hence we first excluded observations with negative interdependence in the following estimation4. We 
regressed the residual correlation between countries on geographical and non-geographical distance variables via a 
random effect model with adjustment of standard errors. Table 5, column (a) reports the results from the second 
stage regression. The coefficients of geographical variables are both significant and indicate that cyber attacks 
originating from countries closer (β = -0.00000302, p < 0.01) and even neighboring (β = 0.05118, p < 0.01) with 
each other are more highly correlated in terms of longitudinal movement. To interpret the coefficients, one kilometer 
increase in distance between a pair of countries is associated with a decrease in country-to-country correlation as 
much as 0.000003. The effect appears to be quite small as the unit is in kilometer. An increase of 10,000 km in 
distance, which is almost the distance between Washington D.C. and Tokyo, Japan, would reduce correlation by 
0.03. The effect of neighboring is more substantial and is associated with increased interdependence as much as 0.05 
in correlation. The coefficient of the distance in Internet access is negative and significant (β = -0.0001870, p < 
0.01). Therefore, similar countries in terms of the Internet access tend to be more interdependent to each other. The 
coefficient of the distance in the ratio of computer, communication and other service import is negative and 
significant (β = -0.001929, p < 0.01). The coefficient of the distance in international collaboration in enforcement as 
measured by status of signature is negative and significant (β = -0.0006458, p < 0.01). Overall, the estimation results 
indicate a good match of our proposed model to cyber attack interdependence and provide strong evidences of the 
interdependence due to the inherent relationship between countries. Among the independent variables, continental 
adjacency is found to be one of the most influential drivers of country level interdependence. In addition, similar 
states in terms of geography, Internet access, IT service import, and international collaboration tend to fortify 
interdependence between two countries.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
In the next specification, we include the interaction effects between non-geographical distance variables and 
physical distance. In the interaction terms, we center each non-geographical distance variable by its mean. Thus the 
coefficient of any non-geographical distance variables has absorbed the moderating effect from the physical 
distance. We exclude the convention indicator about ratification because it is highly correlated with the indicator 
about entry-into-force. Table 5, column (b) reports the results with the interaction effects. Generally, including the 
interaction terms does not change the signs of the coefficients. More interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between physical distance and the distance in status of joining convention on security (as measured by signing 
the convention) is positive and significant. This suggests that the negative impact of physical distance on the 
interdependence is lower (higher) for any pair of countries with different (similar) status in joining the EU 
Convention on Cybercrimes. An intuitive illustration of this finding is that, attackers, who are physically located in a 
country that has signed the EU Convention on Cybercrimes, may deliberately relocate their command and control 
servers for botnet hacking to some distant countries that have not yet signed the convention. By this means, they 
may evade from legal prosecution. The outcome of this strategic behavior from attackers is that the correlation 
between the two countries in terms of the cyber attack movement in longitudinal settings may not match with their 
correlation in physical locations. It further suggests that the jurisdictional boundaries could reduce the spatial 
autocorrelation in cyber attacks.  
As a robust check, we repeat the above regressions in the whole samples with 7725 observation. The results, as 
reported in Table 5, columns (c) and (d), are almost the same, except that the coefficient of the indicator of 
neighboring countries is positive but not significant. 
Concluding Remarks 
Many researchers have emphasized the importance of cross-country collaboration and legislation to address the 
issue of cross-country interdependence of attacks, but the nature of interdependence of attacks across countries is 
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 As a robust check, we did not find any significant difference by including or excluding the observations with negative interdependence. 
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little known yet. Little knowledge on the nature of interdependence has limited governments’ participation in the 
high-level efforts. In this study, we focus on better understanding of the interdependence of cyber attacks across 
countries and how physical boundaries may affect cross-boundary cyber attacks. Our first finding on the role of 
physical boundary is that cyber attacks are not spatially autocorrelated within the same week. Thus, in the short 
term, the interdependence among nearby countries is not significantly higher than that among any pair of distantly 
located countries. The policy implication is that international collaboration to effectively manage the short-term 
interdependence of cyber attacks should not be constrained by country boundaries.  
However, we do find evidence that physical distance and adjacency between countries significantly influence cross-
country interdependence of cyber attacks in the longitudinal setting. Based on the findings, we believe that hackers 
are discriminating their targets in the long term. The most interesting finding is that the degree of discrimination by 
physical boundaries may be moderated by the level of collaboration between a pair of countries, which is 
operationalized by joining the EU Convention on Cybercrimes in this paper. That is, little collaboration between 
distantly located countries tends to increase interdependence between them. It implies that cyber attacks by hackers 
may strategically migrate to distant countries to exploit jurisdictional limitations between countries.  
One interesting extension of our study would be to examine the nature of interdependence across different 
communication ports. For instance, “the Well Known Ports are assigned by the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority) and on most systems can only be used by system (or root) processes or by programs executed by 
privileged users” while “the Registered Ports are listed by the IANA and on most systems can be used by ordinary 
user processes or programs executed by ordinary users.” As different communications ports are used for different 
purposes, the interdependence may be better studied at the port level.  
Our study has a few limitations. First, we were unable to collect the data on the number of attacks between a pair of 
two countries. That is, we could not observe the targeted countries of the attacks. If we had the data, we could have 
directly measured the amount of interdependent attacks between a country pair. Second, some country-specific 
variables are available only at the yearly level while the attacks are measured at the weekly level in the first stage. 
Third, since our data only covers 62 countries, bias may be introduced in the dependent variable, in which the ratio 
of the number of attacks originating in country i in week w over the average weekly attacks from the 62 countries 
rather than from all the countries in the world. The overall implication of this study is clear. International 
collaboration does not have to be constrained by physical distances and adjacency to manage the short term 
interdependence. However, the long term interdependence can be better managed if the physical boundary of 
countries is taken into account. Despite some limitations, our study is one of the first attempts to examine the 
country-level interdependence using econometric methods. 
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 Table 1. Independent variables. 
Factors as independent 
variables Measurements 
GDP per capita, GDPiw. Economy level 
 Unemployment with tertiary education, UMPiw. 
Internet user base, IUSERi.5 Internet usage 
 Price basket for Internet monthly subscription, IPRICEiw. 
IT Industry infrastructure Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service imports), IMPiw.6 
Status with the convention on Cybercrimes: signature(=1), CONSIGNiw. 
Status with the convention on Cybercrimes: ratification(=1), CONRATiw. International collaboration in enforcement 
Status with the convention on Cybercrimes: entry into force(=1), CONFORiw. 
Offences The number of offences per 100,000 inhabitants, OFSiw. 
Maximum(GDPiw /GDPjw, GDPjw /GDPiw), the value is constant within a year. Economy distance 
 Maximum(UMPiw /UMPjw, UMPjw /UMPiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Maximum(IUSERiw /IUSERjw, IUSERjw /IUSERiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Internet usage distance Maximum(IPRICEiw /IPRICEjw, IPRICEjw /IPRICEiw) , the value is constant within a 
year. 
IT Industry infrastructure 
Distance Maximum(IMPiw /IMPjw, IMPjw /IMPiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Absolute value (ΣCONSIGNiw- ΣCONSIGNjw), ΣCONSIGNiw is the aggregation within 
one year. 
Absolute value (ΣCONRATiw- ΣCONRATjw), ΣCONRATiw is the aggregation within a 
year. 
Distance in International 
collaboration in 
enforcement 
Absolute value (ΣCONFORiw- ΣCONFORjw), ΣCONFORiw is the aggregation within a 
year. 
Offences distance Maximum(OFSiw /OFSjw, OFSjw /OFSiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Distance in kilometers, time-constant value. 
Geographic Distance 
Indicator of neighboring country, time-constant value. 
 
                                                          
5
 Note that we adopt the Internet user base instead of the Internet penetration rate. The rationale is that the number of 
nodes in network is an important determinant of cyber attacks originating from a particular country. In addition, the 
Internet penetration rate is somewhat redundant as it is highly correlated with the economy level.  
6
 Another or probably better measurement for IT industry infrastructure is the IT and related products and services 
produced in the nation. However, the data is not available.    
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Table 2. Status of countries that have joined the EU convention on Cybercrimes.7 
States Signature Ratification Entry into force States Signature Ratification 
Entry 
into force 
Albania 11/23/2001 6/20/2002 7/1/2004 Hungary 11/23/2001 12/4/2003 7/1/2004 
Armenia 11/23/2001 10/12/2006 2/1/2007 Ireland 2/28/2002   
Austria 11/23/2001   Iceland 11/30/2001 1/29/2007 5/1/2007 
Azerbaijan 6/30/2008   Italy 11/23/2001 6/5/2008 10/1/2008 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2/9/2005 5/19/2006 9/1/2006 Japan 11/23/2001   
Belgium 11/23/2001   Liechtenstein 11/17/2008   
Bulgaria 11/23/2001 4/7/2005 8/1/2005 Lithuania 6/23/2003 3/18/2004 7/1/2004 
Canada 11/23/2001   Luxembourg 1/28/2003   
Switzerland 11/23/2001   Latvia 5/5/2004 2/14/2007 6/1/2007 
Montenegro 4/7/2005   Moldova 11/23/2001   
Serbia 4/7/2005   
Former 
Yugoslav Rep. 
of Macedonia 
11/23/2001 9/15/2004 1/1/2005 
Cyprus 11/23/2001 1/19/2005 5/1/2005 Malta 1/17/2002   
Czech 
Republic 2/9/2005   Netherlands 11/23/2001 11/16/2006 3/1/2007 
Germany 11/23/2001   Norway 11/23/2001 6/30/2006 10/1/2006 
Denmark 4/22/2003 6/21/2005 10/1/2005 Poland 11/23/2001   
Estonia 11/23/2001 5/12/2003 7/1/2004 Portugal 11/23/2001   
Spain 11/23/2001   Romania 11/23/2001 5/12/2004 9/1/2004 
Finland 11/23/2001 5/24/2007 9/1/2007 Sweden 11/23/2001   
France 11/23/2001 1/10/2006 5/1/2006 Slovenia 7/24/2002 9/8/2004 1/1/2005 
United 
Kingdom 11/23/2001   Slovakia 2/4/2005 1/8/2008 5/1/2008 
Georgia 4/1/2008   Ukraine 11/23/2001 3/10/2006 7/1/2006 
Greece 11/23/2001   United States 11/23/2001 9/29/2006 1/1/2007 
Croatia 11/23/2001 10/17/2002 7/1/2004 South Africa 11/23/2001   
 
                                                          
7
 Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG.  
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Table 4. Systemic interdependence and country-specific effects (both dependent variable and independent 
variables are in natural logarithm forms except the indicator of convention on information security)  
Dependent variable: ratio over the average weekly attacks 
Independent variables Fixed effects 
(d) 
OLS: panel-
corrected standard 
error 
(e) 
OLS: panel-
corrected standard 
error 
(f) 
GDP per capita 3.2333*** (0.2455) 
3.2333*** 
(0.2341) 
1.9543*** 
(0.5316) 
Internet access -0.1747*** (0.05677) 
-0.1747** 
(0.07124) 
-0.05381 
(0.1076) 
Ratio of internet security servers ─ ─ -0.1648 (0.1357) 
Internet price ─ ─ -0.1326*** (0.03873) 
Convention on security -0.2242*** (0.08517) 
-0.2242*** 
(0.05504) 
-0.3215*** 
(0.07224) 
Ratio of IT service import -0.4638*** (0.07246) 
-0.4638*** 
(0.06733) 
-0.3091*** 
(0.08948) 
Ratio of offences -1.6216*** (0.1388) 
-1.6216*** 
(0.1348) 
-1.9470*** 
(0.3907) 
Unemployed with territory education ─ ─ 0.9653*** (0.1159) 
Year 2004 -0.01844 (0.03203) 
-0.01844 
(0.02976) 
0.1749** 
(0.07397) 
Year 2005 -0.02578 (0.04130) 
-0.02578 
(0.03519) 
0.1876* 
(0.1057) 
Year 2006 -0.2207*** (0.05596) 
-0.2207*** 
(0.04530) 
0.1955 
(0.1790) 
Year 2007 -0.2507*** (0.07251) 
-0.2507*** 
(0.05812) 
0.00000000 
(0.00000000) 
Constant 5.4203*** (1.1733) 
0.00000000 
(0.00000000) 
11.9081*** 
(4.3830) 
No. of Observations 11870 11870 5845 
No. of countries 62 62 55 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Country-specific interdependence (Dependent variable: the correlation of residuals by country and year from 
stage 1) 
Dependent variable: the correlation of the residuals between countries per 
year; the residuals were derived from regression of the ratio over the weekly 
average attacks in stage 1. 
Independent variables 
Random effects 
(a) 
Including 
moderating 
effects 
(b) 
Random effects 
(c) 
Including 
moderating 
effects 
(d) 
Physical distance -0.00000302*** -0.00000690*** -0.00000959*** (0.00000115) 
-0.00001171*** 
(0.00000218) 
Neiboring country 0.05118*** (0.01558) 
0.04530*** 
(0.01560) 
0.02443 
(0.01882) 
0.02135 
(0.01892) 
Distance in GDP per cap 0.0009928 (0.0009908) 
0.001532 
(0.001033) 
-0.003737*** 
(0.001165) 
-0.003977*** 
(0.001195) 
Distance in GDP per cap * Physical distance ─ 0.00000136*** (0.00000042) ─ 
0.00000070 
(0.00000050) 
Distance in internet access -0.0001870** (0.00009001) 
-0.0001051 
(0.0001098) 
-0.0003021*** 
(0.0001010) 
-0.0001301 
(0.0001350) 
Distance in internet access * Physical distance ─ -0.00000005 (0.00000004) ─ 
-0.00000008* 
(0.00000004) 
Distance in days with signature of convention on 
security 
-0.0006458*** 
(0.0001254) 
-0.0006889*** 
(0.0001256) 
-0.001075*** 
(0.0001595) 
-0.001146*** 
(0.0001610) 
Distance in days with signature of convention on 
security * Physical distance ─ 
0.00000010*** 
(0.00000004) ─ 
0.00000009* 
(0.00000005) 
Distance in days with ratification of convention 
on security 
-0.0001451 
(0.0003316) ─ 
0.0005348 
(0.0004473) ─ 
Distance in days with entry-into-force of 
convention on security 
-0.0001918 
(0.0003652) 
-0.0003612** 
(0.0001819) 
-0.0005304 
(0.0004868) 
0.00003507 
(0.0002240) 
Distance in days with entry-into-force of 
convention on security * Physical distance 
─ 0.00000003 
(0.00000005) ─ 
0.00000011* 
(0.00000006) 
Distance in the ratio of IT service import -0.001929*** (0.0004439) 
-0.002011*** 
(0.0005194) 
-0.0003378 
(0.0004555) 
-0.0002020 
(0.0005703) 
Distance in IT service import ratio * Physical 
distance ─ 
-0.00000010 
(0.00000021) ─ 
0.00000014 
(0.00000021) 
Distance in offences -0.00006509 (0.0002326) 
0.00002248 
(0.0002669) 
-0.0002039 
(0.0002750) 
0.0003010 
(0.0002988) 
Distance in offences per 100000 * Physical 
distance ─ 
-0.00000019 
(0.00000012) ─ 
-0.00000035*** 
(0.00000012) 
Constant 0.3001*** (0.008449) 
0.31679935*** 
(0.01057507) 
0.1777*** 
(0.01076) 
0.1882*** 
(0.01426) 
No. of observations 4649 4649 7725 7725 
No. of pairs of countries 1786 1786 1830 1830 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include year fixed effects 
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